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Thirteen American States point the way for the Nations now...

It must be done again

United World Federalists Pamphlets

by Vernon Nash

with a foreword by Norman Cousins, author of "Modern Man is Obsolete"

25¢

UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS
2046-A UNIVERSITY AVENUE
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—From the Foreword to the first two printings (1940 and 1941) by the author of "The Tree of Liberty."

Here compressed in twenty-five pamphlet pages is . . . a careful inquiry into the forces at work in a former stage of this same struggle in which we are involved today, the struggle of mankind to enlarge the framework of its government. Quiet years went into the preparation of this inquiry, years have tested its wisdom; and now it has been compressed and republished because of the light it throws on today's problems. We cannot afford to let it pass unread.

ELIZABETH PAGE

To John Fiske, who wrote in his "Critical Period":

"In some future still grander convention we trust the same thing will be done between states that have been wholly sovereign, whereby peace may gain and violence be diminished over other lands than this which has set the example."

Concerning the Compiler

Vernon Nash is National Director of Field Work, World Federalists, U.S.A. Prior to the formation of this organization late in 1945 by a consolidation of a number of existing organizations devoted to the creation of a federal world government, he had been giving most of his time for several years to the presenting of the case for such a world government to American audiences under professional lecture management. During 1941-42, he was executive director of the National Peace Conference, a consultative council of most national organizations with an interest in world affairs.

Dr. Nash was chosen as Rhodes Scholar from Missouri in 1916, and served with the British Army in India and East Africa in 1917-18. He founded the first school of journalism in Asia at Yenching University, Peiping, in 1924, and was professor of journalism in that institution, 1924-36. He has two degrees in journalism from the University of Missouri, and the Ed. D. degree from Teachers College, Columbia University. He is the author of several books, and of many articles in periodical publications.

It Must Be Done Again

—In the 1780's American Federal Union

—In the 1940's Federal World Government

By

VERNON NASH

Chiefly an Edited, Abridged Version of
John Fiske's
"CRITICAL PERIOD
OF AMERICAN HISTORY"

Manufactured in the United States of America

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Foreword

IN a lecture some nine or ten years ago, Nicholas Murray Butler referred to the period from 1781 to 1789 as the lost years of American history. Lost in the sense that not one child out of 10,000, he said, had any idea of the real meaning of that period in the story of this nation. He pointed out that the general idea planted or promoted in our teaching was that there was a clear-cut and immediate cause-and-effect relationship between the American Revolution and the founding of the American Constitution. Both these events had been conveniently though fallaciously tied together so tightly that the average youngster had naturally come to think of them as part of the same bundle.

Glossed over, he pointed out, was the fact that the individual states came out of the American Revolution as rigid entities—independent nations whose ties—and not too strong ties at that—were as former allies rather than as partners in a continuing enterprise. The peoples were largely heterogeneous; there were varying and frequently conflicting systems of political, economic, monetary, and social organization. Sovereignty, separation, and sectarianism—these fixed the thinking of the day.

When Dr. Butler criticized the schools for failing to give proper weight and clarity to the period of international anarchy in America following the Revolution, he was not attempting merely to plug a leak as a matter of sheer academic concern over completeness in the curriculum. His primary purpose was to call attention to a "critical period" not only in the history of America but in the history of the world. For the first time, a genuine union was made out of the stuff of disparity and in the face of seemingly irreconcilable jealousies. And the triumph belongs even more to the general political evolution of the world than it does to America alone. Here is the definitive answer to those who believe that the differences among peoples are automatically more important than their similarities. As an answer, too, it tells of a valid laboratory for the needs of the world today. That was the real meaning of the period.

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On a somewhat smaller scale, there are yet other lessons offered up by the American laboratory, which Fiske has so carefully examined. There is a strange and dangerous chemical reaction that sets in after wars, of which Greece after the Persian Wars, Europe after 843, America after 1781, and Europe again after 1918, are only a few examples, causing peoples to fall to fighting among themselves. Once the common peril was lifted, the cement that held people together turned to water. Obviously, an equivalent was needed—the equivalent of a common government.

What we have to face today is the reality that only this central authority can hope to cope with the psychology of violence that is the dominating characteristic of the age. This is hardly unique, nor should it surprise us; after five or more years of war, men are not likely to regard their objectives as attainable in any way other than by direct force. After the Treaty of Verdun in the ninth century, from which date stems the political divisions and the interminable misery of Europe, the people turned to violence in their dealings among themselves as though it were as natural as passing the time of day. By the eleventh century, things got so violent in even the most casual dealings, as E. A. Freeman tells us in his "Norman Conquest," that a huge movement sprang up to limit the bloodletting. Accordingly, a Truce with God was arranged by which all good men and true agreed not to murder each other during the period from Wednesday evening to the following Monday morning of each week, after which we suppose all bets were off, unless of course the anniversary of Christ's supper or some other high holiday fell on a Tuesday, in which case murder was regarded as distinctly in bad taste.

This sounds farcical; but we have not yet reached the pinnacle of a Sinai from which we can point at ages supposedly less remarkable than our own. The fact is that before we can laugh at the past, we shall at least have to make the apparently virgin admission that there is some connection between yesterday and today. But that in turn would doubtless cause us to stumble into learning something that might be helpful now. The world must be full of these terrifying possibilities.

NORMAN COUSINS

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It Must Be Done Again

Today's Parallels With the 1780's

By VERNON NASH

INTRODUCTION

THE world must be governed. We dare not longer depend on unenforceable agreements set forth in treaties, or upon purely voluntary collaboration among nations in a loose association of fully sovereign states such as the U.N. An authority representative of all mankind must have *power to control* all factors in the common life of humanity which affect to a *vital degree* the safety and welfare of all men. The potentialities of the atomic bomb make such a development an immediate, impelling necessity.

The federal system of government seems best suited to this primary political need of the world. An agreed-upon division of sovereign powers is the essential element in federalism. World federalism would make it possible to provide common government in the areas of universal concern while leaving every nation as independent as ever in all matters which are strictly national in scope and character.

The fatal weakness of any league or confederation system is that it must depend upon willing compliance with its decisions by its member-nations. If it fails to secure such obedience, it must call upon military forces voluntarily supplied by the nations in its membership on a vigilante-band basis. The willingness of such armed member-nations to contribute contingents to such international forces of confederations has always proved uncertain and undependable in every league of which we have any record. It is for this reason, chiefly, that history is strewn with the wrecks of leagues. The futility of every one of them was manifested in ways strikingly similar to the collapse of the League of Nations in our day. The U.N. quite obviously moves toward a similar tragic end.

Even if we assume that an "international police force" of vigilantes from sovereign nations could successfully be formed, it could only operate upon an entire national unit—innocent and guilty alike. This perpetuates war as the one available method of attempting to enforce peace, an outright contradiction in terms. War is the attempt of one organized society of men to coerce another organized group. The one acceptable and workable alternative to an institutionalized war-system is the enforcement of statutory law upon individual violators.

A federal union is a federation of peoples, not a league of completely sovereign national states. A world federation should have power to enact statutory international law, and the laws of this federal world government should be made applicable to individuals and enforced upon individual persons. Under such methods of maintaining public order, the use of military forces becomes necessary only in the event of organized armed rebellion. Should developments reach that extreme—rare in federal systems—the common government of a federal union does not have to turn to the uncertain, inefficient and undependable weapon of an international force which must be mobilized *after* the crisis has arisen. A government has its own forces, recruited by itself and maintained under its own direction and control, ready for use at a moment's notice. Consequently, it is ordinarily able to prevent war on any scale. It is just such sure and prompt means of *preventing* war which the world needs beyond all else.

An all-inclusive Commonwealth of Man, formed now on federal principles, is utterly desirable. If we cannot secure universality of membership at its beginning, then the largest possible nucleus which can be secured by mutual consent is obviously the next best thing. We may be compelled to make the start with a group of member-nations much smaller than we could wish. Even such a small nucleus would grow rapidly and peaceably toward the objective, despite fearful handicaps, *provided* its initial membership was sufficiently cross-sectional and *provided* its constitution was clearly designed for universality. Its membership must be wide open at all times to any nation willing to undertake the

agreed-upon obligations. Such a nuclear world government must make it unmistakably plain to all the peoples of earth that it looks toward a parliament of man in a federation of the whole world. It can do this by the nature of its constitution and by including in its membership from the beginning willing peoples from every part of the globe.

The compiler of this pamphlet prior to the outbreak of World War II and before America's entry into it believed that some such method as that proposed by Clarence K. Streit in his *original* "Union Now" (1939) was the most promising way to get a world government started. Perhaps it was the only way under normal peace-time conditions. Even then, however, it was his conviction that the largest number obtainable by mutual agreement was preferable to any prescribed nucleus such as Streit urged. (See second printing of this pamphlet, p. 47.)

Participation in war makes men think more inclusively rather than less so; hence the tragedy of Streit's retreat to such narrower applications of his fundamental thesis as are found in his "Union Now With Britain" (1941) and in his war-time edition of parts of the original book, plus three new chapters, published in 1944. We now are given at least a good fighting chance to get more swiftly what is avowedly the ultimate objective of us all, a world-wide commonwealth of all men. Let all nations among which mutual agreement can be obtained join now through ratification of a world constitution, framed by a representative international conference to which all have been invited.

If any nation remains aloof, let it be by its own choice, not because of its exclusion by the rest of us. The risks we shall thus run by a close union of unlikes, by the inclusion of countries with little or no experience in operating representative forms of government, will be very great. They will not be as great, however, as will the dangers inherent in leaving the world basically divided. The menace would not even be comparable to the threat under which we will live if the means which are used to secure a nucleus union produce a rival grouping of hostile nations.

Since the publication of Streit's "Union Now" in 1939, popular

interest in possible applications of federalism to the world's problem has steadily increased. This turns attention to the instances where an agreed-upon division of powers between a common government and the governments of constituent parts is found. At least one nation on every continent has been grappling successfully with the same baffling issues which would confront a world government. Growing national unity has been created in countries which have great differences of race, language and geography.

The United States, Canada, South Africa, Switzerland, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Australia and the Soviet Union all unite large, widely separated territories in which live varied races speaking two or more languages. Only Switzerland is small and it has peculiarly difficult racial mixtures, German, French and Italian. It would seem beyond the bounds of possible coincidence that every country in which unity has been created democratically out of great diversity operates under a federal system of government. This fact justifies the conclusion that federalism is made to order for the world's need.

Search for the most promising method of getting a federal world government started and functioning directs attention in turn to the beginnings of existing federal unions. It is natural that this interest would be greatest in the case of the first government on fully federal lines, the United States of America, especially since it has developed into the most powerful country on earth. Fascination mounts as a reader notes the many points of similarity between conditions in our world now and those in North America in the 1780's. Some of the analogies are so close as to be virtual parallels.

This pamphlet deals with American beginnings only. Confidence that the analogies noted have an essential validity for our time is heightened by the significant fact that similar elements of difficulty and of advantage were to be found in the critical, creative periods of each of the other federal unions. The reader can verify this assertion in swift outline by consulting the history sections of articles in any standard encyclopaedia on each of these countries: Canada, Switzerland, South Africa, Mexico, Australia, Venezuela and the Argentine.

The fundamental factor of greatest significance in international relations today is anarchy in the relations among nations. Anarchy is not the absence of law; it is the absence of *enforced* law. There can be no enforcement of international law so long as nations retain the power to do whatever they may think necessary in their own presumed self-interest and retain the right to be sole judge of the wisdom and righteousness of their own acts. The results of such anarchy in our modern world resembles closely the lawless chaos in the relations among the American states during the decade just before the adoption of their federal constitution. These states emerged from the Revolutionary War possessing virtually all the powers of sovereign nations, thinking of themselves as fully independent, *and above all acting toward each other as absolute sovereignties do today.*

The results then resembled closely what we see all about us in the modern world—tariff and monetary monstrosities, territorial disputes involving bloodshed, widespread unemployment, depression, traders reduced to barter by the virtual worthlessness of the separate currencies of the states, and so on through the long, distressing, and disgraceful list then as now.

Perhaps the most exact counterpart is to be found in a comparison of the grounds for the deep pessimism and defeatism which dominated men's minds in the 1780's as they do today. It was seen that something must be done, and quickly, if utter disaster were to be averted, yet little hope existed of getting anything adequate done in time because it was mistakenly believed that nothing whatever could lead the peoples of the several states to transfer enough of their sovereign powers to make possible the creation of a common national government.

All these facts are vividly revealed in John Fiske's "Critical Period of American History." Quoted excerpts from it form the body of this pamphlet.

It is sometimes suggested today that Fiske overemphasized political factors. It is true that Fiske described developments chiefly in political terms but, as will be seen, he continually gave prominence to the profound influence of economic chaos upon the

thinking of the founders of the American Republic and upon the decisions of the people who followed their leadership.

Both political and economic factors are so inter-related and so inter-dependent that conditions in each field reciprocally affect those in the other to an extraordinary degree. Every public order is a political economy. It is an essential thesis of all types of world federalists, however, that reasonably effective political machinery is necessary in order for sound economic adjustments to be made peaceably. *The political factor is therefore believed to be primary.* Neither is sufficient; both are essential; but political power is predominant by reason of the coercive agencies of the state.

Very many of the reasons offered then for opposing the formation of a strong central government in the United States were stated in language amazingly like that of the arguments now used against the establishment of a greater federal union. Some of them sound as if they came out of today's *Chicago Tribune,* or from a pamphlet of an "America First" committee. The continuity of the account in this pamphlet is interrupted at intervals by comments designed to spotlight such analogies, and suggested parallels of the 1780's with today are specifically set down together in the closing pages of this pamphlet.

That any true counterparts exist between the 1780's and 1940's is questioned by some. Their main argument would seem to be that the American Union was formed because a real community of interest actually existed among the thirteen states while, it is insisted, no such unity can be found among the nations today.

"Oh, but this is different," is usually the most common response to suggestions that light and encouragement in present perplexities can be drawn from historical parallels. The chief thesis of this pamphlet is that our inter-national situation today is *not essentially different* from the chaos which confronted the founders of the American Republic, though differing from it, of course, in many details.

The Oxford University Press has a reputation for emphasis upon careful scholarship in its publications; one of its major claims is to profound erudition. Yet this publishing house, which no one

would accuse of popularizing, introduced an expensive, two-volume life of Washington with remarks concerning "the surprising parallels" between his time and ours.

What most persons *believe* to be the facts, not the actual facts, are usually the great obstacle to the formation of new political unions. Nations today are much more inter-related and interdependent than were the American states then, only most human beings are as blind to the fact and to its significance as were the early Americans to their essential unities. The outlook seemed as hopeless to most persons then as the prospects for an orderly and law-abiding world seem today.

Thomas Paine, whose "Common Sense" did much to bring about the Declaration of Independence, can scarcely be thought to have had any prejudice against Americans. He was a person of exceptional competence, as is shown by the wide impact in both America and Europe of several books by him. Moreover, he had a close, personal acquaintance with citizens of all the colonies. Yet he wrote concerning America:

> *Made up as it is of people from different nations, accustomed to different forms and habits of government, speaking different languages, and more different in their modes of worship, it would appear that the union of such a people is impracticable.*

Many other contemporary judgments alleged the impossibility or the improbability of ever getting the American states together in a more perfect union. Even in the midst of the constitutional convention itself, Washington declared: "It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted." Some of the foremost Revolutionary leaders, including Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee, fought the adoption of the Constitution with all the influence and energy they possessed.

The word "national" is not found in the American Constitution. "Nation" occurs only twice and then in the phrases, foreign nations and law of nations. Widespread prejudice against nationalism was shared even by many delegates to the constitutional convention of 1788. A nationalist (meaning then one who desired a strong central government in America) seems to have been disliked by most early

Americans just as so many now disapprove of an internationalist.

The American Union came into being because *able and earnest individuals in sufficient numbers worked unceasingly* to that end in the belief that it must be done and it therefore could be done. Just so, world federal union will, in my opinion, be established in our time.

In what shape would the North American continent be today if the nationalists of the 1780's had not succeeded in establishing a federal union?

Is it likely that Canada, Switzerland, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia and South Africa would have been able to solve their similar problems so well if they had not had before them the impressive demonstration of the practicability of the federal form of government supplied by the United States of America?

Where will humanity be tomorrow in an inter-dependent world if short-sighted prejudice against a sane internationalism now prevents, or too long delays, the establishment of a federal world government?

Whenever any such radical change is needed, at least the first step simply has to be a jump. It was not a step but a magnificent leap forward which mankind made in 1789. It must be done again.



General Introductory Note

Warm appreciation is felt by the compiler and by World Federalists, U.S.A., for the unusual generosity of the owners of the copyright of Fiske's classic of 1888 in granting permission to print at such length from the volume.

In order to improve its readability as a pamphlet, the continuity of the account is not interrupted by page references; readers may readily locate most passages by consulting the index in Fiske's "Critical Period." Quotation marks are also omitted; materials not derived verbatim from Fiske in the following section are clearly indicated. *Headings for the various divisions were written by the compiler.* Some changes in the paragraphing were made.

It is realized that placing sentences together which are in some cases widely separated in the book may at times produce impressions not intended by the author. All contexts have been carefully studied in an attempt to avoid this. Those who are convinced that any instance is misinterpreted will, it is hoped, write the compiler in care of World Federalists, U.S.A., 31 E. 74th St., New York 21, N. Y. He will wish to correct in further printings anything herein which may be shown to be unjustified.

Each reader may judge for himself from the record how much our present inter-national situation resembles the essential conditions of the post-Colonial period in America. Particular instances can be studied more fully by consulting the indexes to standard American histories. An exhaustive bibliography of works dealing with the period is supplied in the great novel by Elizabeth Page, "The Tree of Liberty."

Some history teachers have implied in personal conversations that Fiske is "out of date." I've been unable to find the charge in any responsible work. The essentials of his "Critical Period" are verifiable in every definitive modern American history I've been able to consult. It is a striking fact, for example, that Charles Beard (who created such a stir with his "Economic Interpretation of the Constitution") presents an account far closer to Fiske than to his own earlier interpretation, in his latest work, "A Basic History of the U.S." (see chapter IX, pp. 120-137.) An excellent and authoritative source, readily accessible to any reader, is the magnificent "Pocket History of the U.S." by Nevins and Commager, historians on the faculty of Columbia University. Consult, in particular, pages 115-136 in this history which can be secured for 25 cents wherever the familiar Pocket Book series is sold.

An excellent summary, substantiating Fiske's account, is available in the Encyclopædia Britannica's article on the United States of America (Section 10, "History"). The following selections from Fiske's classic volume of 368 pages sketch the situation in the years 1781-1789 in a continuous, connected story. It is most earnestly hoped that the reading of this outline will lead many readers to secure the book and study the account in full.—V.N.

Origins of the First Great Federal Union

—Verbatim excerpts from John Fiske's "Critical Period of American History," used with the permission of its publishers, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York.

AMERICANS of 1783 dwelt in a long, straggling series of republics, fringing the Atlantic Coast. . . . They had begun to act consistently and independently in common under the pressure of a common fear and an immediate necessity of action. Even under such circumstances the [Revolutionary] War had languished and come nigh to failure simply through the difficulty of insuring concerted action. . . . Congress had steadily declined in power and in respectability; it was much weaker at the end of the war than at the beginning; and there was reason to fear that as soon as the common pressure was removed the need for concerted action would quite cease to be felt, and the scarcely formed Union would break into pieces. There was the greater reason for such a fear in that, while no strong sentiment had as yet grown up in favor of union, there was an intensely powerful sentiment in favor of local self-government. . . . A most wholesome feeling it was, and one which needed not so much to be curbed as to be guided in the right direction. . . . Unless the most profound and delicate statesmanship should be forthcoming, to take this sentiment under its guidance, there was much reason to fear that the release from the common adhesion to Great Britain would end in setting up thirteen little republics, ripe for endless squabbling. . . .

Provincialism Was Their Patriotism

The different parts of the country knew very little about each other, and local prejudices were intense. It was not simply free Massachusetts and slave-holding South Carolina, or English Connecticut and Dutch New York, that misunderstood and ridi-

culed each the other; but even between such neighboring states as Connecticut and Massachusetts, both of them thoroughly English and Puritan, and in all their social conditions almost exactly alike, it used often to be said that there was no love lost. . . .

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[NOTE: It was doubtless inevitable that independent states with such attitudes toward each other should first attempt to maintain orderly relations among themselves by consultation and by agreements reached in conference. In similar conditions before and since, the confederation type of inter-national order has almost invariably been given a trial. And always such leagues have swiftly proved to be inadequate. In the sections which immediately follow, the reader will observe the remarkable similarity of the Articles of Confederation to the U.N. Charter. And the Articles of Confederation, said Washington, were "a rope of sand which could bind no one." It should be noted with what tragic sureness the forces of anarchy proved to be stronger than those of mere confederation, just as they did in the case of the League of Nations, and as they are now doing under still another confederation, the so-called "United" Nations Organization. No pages in the original will more repay reading in full than this section in Fiske.—V.N.]

League of Friendship Also Inadequate

According to the language of the articles [of Confederation] the states entered into a firm league of friendship with each other; and in order to secure and perpetuate such friendship, the freemen of each state were entitled to all the privileges and immunities of freemen in all the other states. . . . This universal inter-citizenship was what gave reality to the nascent and feeble union. . . . But this was almost the only effectively cohesive provision in the whole instrument. Throughout the remainder of the articles its language was largely devoted to reconciling the theory that the states were severally sovereign with the visible fact that they were already merged to some extent in a larger political body. . . . Not a single step could be taken without the consent of at least nine of the thirteen states; and this provision well-nigh sufficed of itself to block the wheels of federal legislation. . . . Between the Congress thus constituted and the several state governments the attributes of sovereignty were shared in such a way as to produce a minimum of result with a maximum of effort. . . . The political action was at no time based on the view of the states as absolutely sovereign,

but . . . the share of sovereignty accorded to Congress was very inadequate even to the purposes of an effective confederation. . . .

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Essential Powers of Government Lacking

Such was the constitution under which the United States had begun to drift toward anarchy even before the close of the Revolutionary War, but which could only be amended by the unanimous consent of all the thirteen states. . . . Besides this extreme difficulty of amendment, the fatal defects of the Confederation were three in number. This first defect was the two-thirds vote necessary. . . .; under this rule any five of the states . . . could defeat the most sorely needed measures. The second defect was the impossibility of presenting a united front to foreign countries in respect to commerce. The third and greatest defect was the lack of any means, on the part of Congress, of enforcing obedience. . . .

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To save American credit from destruction, it was at least necessary that the interest on the public debt should be paid. For this purpose Congress in 1781 asked permission to levy a five per cent duty on imports. The modest request was the signal for a year of angry discussion. Again and again it was asked, if taxes could thus be levied by any power outside the state, why had we ever opposed the Stamp Act or tea duties? . . . And the worst of it was that no one could point to a remedy for this state of things, or assign any probable end to it. Under such circumstances the public credit sank at home as well as abroad.

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[NOTE: pp. 108-113 recount the plot for direct action against the Continental Congress by soldiers of the Revolutionary Army, which was instigated by officers of the highest rank who played upon justifiable anger over failure to receive pay. A military coup d'etat was narrowly averted by the influence of Washington. Later, less than a hundred unpaid Pennsylvania veterans marched upon the Congress in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, causing its members to flee when they could get no protection either from the city or from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.—V.N.]

Thus in a city of thirty-two thousand inhabitants, the largest city

in the country, the government of the United States, the body which had just completed a treaty browbeating England and France, was ignominiously turned out-of-doors by a handful of drunken mutineers. The affair was laughed at by many, but sensible men keenly felt the disgrace, and asked what would be thought in Europe of a government which could not even command the services of the police. . . .

Shamed Abroad; Not Respected at Home

From the weakness of Congress as illustrated in its inability to raise money to pay the public debt and meet the current expenses of government, and from the popular dread of military usurpation which went along with the uneasy consciousness of that weakness, we have now to turn to another group of affairs in which the same point is still further illustrated and emphasized. . . . Congress . . . was bound by the treaty [of peace] to recommend to the several states to desist from the persecution of Tories . . . ; and it had been further agreed that all private debts should be discharged at their full value in sterling money. It now turned out that Congress was powerless to carry out the provisions of the treaty upon either of these points. . . . Amid such mutual jealousies and misgivings, during the year 1785 acts were passed by ten states granting to Congress the power of regulating commerce. . . . The acts of the ten were, as might have been expected, a jumble of incongruities. . . . Meanwhile, the different states, with their different tariff and tonnage acts, began to make commercial war upon one another. . . . [Governor Clinton of New York] was the vigorous and steadfast advocate of every illiberal and exclusive measure, and the most uncompromising enemy to a closer union of the states. Under his guidance, the history of New York, during the five years following the peace of 1783, was a shameful story of greedy monopoly and sectional hate. Of all the thirteen states, none behaved worse except Rhode Island.

Wars, Both Commercial and Territorial

To these commercial disputes there were added disputes about territory. The chronic quarrel between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the valley of Wyoming [in North Central Penn-

sylvania] was decided in the autumn of 1782 by a special federal court, appointed in accordance with the articles of confederation. The prize was adjudged to Pennsylvania, and the government of Connecticut submitted as gracefully as possible. But new troubles were in store for the inhabitants of that beautiful region. The traces of the massacre of 1778 had disappeared, the houses had been rebuilt, new settlers had come in, and the pretty villages had taken on their old look of contentment and thrift, when in the spring of 1784 there came an accumulation of disasters. . . . The people were starving with cold and hunger, and President Dickinson urged the legislature to send prompt relief to the sufferers. But the hearts of the members were as flint, and their talk was incredibly wicked. Not a penny would they give to help the accursed Yankees. It served them right. If they had stayed in Connecticut, where they belonged, they would have kept out of harm's way. . . .

But the cruelty of the Pennsylvania legislature was not confined to words. A scheme was devised for driving out the settlers and partitioning their lands among a company of speculators. A force of militia was sent to Wyoming, commanded by a truculent creature named Patterson. The ostensible purpose was to assist in restoring order in the valley, but the behavior of the soldiers was such as would have disgraced a horde of barbarians. They stole what they could find, dealt out blows to the men and insults to the women, until their violence was met with violence in return. Then Patterson sent a letter to President Dickinson, accusing the farmers of sedition, and hinting that extreme measures were necessary. Having thus, as he thought, prepared the way, he attacked the settlement, turned some five hundred people out-of-doors, and burned their houses to the ground. The wretched victims, many of them tender women, or infirm old men, or little children, were driven into the wilderness at the point of the bayonet, and told to find their way to Connecticut without further delay. Heart-rending scenes ensued. Many died of exhaustion, or furnished food for wolves. . . . All the Connecticut men in the neighboring country flew to arms. Men were killed on both sides, and presently Patterson was besieged.

A regiment of soldiers was then sent from Philadelphia, under Colonel Armstrong. . . . On arriving in the valley, Armstrong held a parley with the Connecticut men, and persuaded them to lay down their arms; assuring them on his honor that they should meet with no ill treatment, and that their enemy, Patterson, should be disarmed also. Having thus fallen into this soldier's clutches, they were forthwith treated as prisoners.

Great was the indignation in New England when these deeds were heard of. The matter had become very serious. A war between Connecticut and Pennsylvania might easily grow out of it. . . . [but] the wickedness of the affair began to dawn upon people's minds [in Pennsylvania], and they were ashamed of what had been done. . . . and it was ordered that full reparation should be made to the persecuted settlers.

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[New York, New Hampshire and Massachusetts wrangled over the status and boundaries of Vermont.] New York sent troops to the threatened frontier, New Hampshire prepared to do likewise, and for the moment war seemed inevitable. But here, as in so many other instances, Washington appeared as peacemaker.

It Was Federalism That Saved Us

Incidents like these . . . seem trivial, perhaps . . . but their historic lesson is none the less clear. . . . They show us a glimpse of the untold dangers and horrors from which the adoption of our Federal Constitution has so thoroughly freed us that we can only with some effort realize how narrowly we have escaped them. . . . With quarrels about trade and quarrels about boundaries, we seemed to be treading the old-fashioned paths of anarchy. . . . No one could possibly foresee that within five years a number of gentlemen at Philadelphia . . . would amicably discuss the situation and agree upon a new system of government whereby the danger might be once for all averted. Still less could any one foresee that these gentlemen . . . would actually succeed, without serious civil dissension, in making the people of thirteen states adopt, defend,

and cherish it. History afforded no example of such a gigantic act of constructive statesmanship.

Washington Calls the Turn

"It is as clear to me as A, B, C," said Washington, "that an extension of federal powers would make us one of the most happy, wealthy, respectable, and powerful nations that ever inhabited the terrestrial globe. Without them we shall soon be everything which is the direct reverse. . . ." There is no telling how long the wretched state of things which followed the Revolution might have continued, had not the crisis been precipitated by the wild attempts of the several states to remedy the distress of the people by legislation. . . . We had little else but specie with which to pay for imports, and the country was soon drained of what little specie there was. . . . There was a reversion to the practice of barter, and the revival of business was thus further impeded.

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In many parts of the country, by the year 1786, the payment of taxes had come to be regarded as an amiable eccentricity. At one moment, early in 1782, there was not a single dollar in the treasury. By 1786, under the universal depression and want of confidence, all trade had well nigh stopped, and political quackery with its cheap and dirty remedies had full control of the field. . . . Things had come to such a pass that people of all shades of opinion were beginning to agree upon one thing—that something must be done and done quickly.

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Toward a National Federal Government

During the Revolutionary War, in a series of romantic expeditions, the state of Virginia took military possession of a great part of the wilderness east of the Mississippi. . . . Americans claimed the territory as part of the United States; but when once it passed from under the control of Great Britain, into whose hands did it go? . . . Four states laid claim either to the whole or parts of the territory [north of the Ohio River], and these claims were not simply conflicting, but irreconcilable. . . . Of these conflicting claims,

those of New York and Virginia were the most grasping and the most formidable, because they concerned a region into which immigration was beginning rapidly to pour. They were regarded with strong disfavor by the small states . . . so situated that they never could expand in any direction. They looked forward with dread to a future in which New York and Virginia might wax powerful enough to tyrannize over their smaller neighbors.

But of these protesting states it was only Maryland that fairly rose to the occasion, and suggested an idea which seemed startling at first, but from which mighty and unforeseen consequences were soon to flow. . . . Just as it was Massachusetts that took the decisive step in bringing on the Revolutionary War when she threw the tea into Boston Harbor, so it was Maryland that, by leading the way toward the creation of a national domain, laid the corner stone of our Federal Union. Equal credit must be given to Virginia for her magnanimity in making that desired surrender . . . of a princely territory of which she was actually in possession.

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[NOTE: South and west of the trans-Allegheny territories, a great area controlled by Spain dominated the natural outlet of these territories to the sea. The same power had other large holdings in the Western World, making a trade agreement with her very attractive to the maritime New England states. For such a treaty, Spain demanded full control of the lower Mississippi. If this were refused, she threatened not only to take it by force but also to annex areas to the north of the Gulf Coast which had been ceded by Britain to the United States in the treaty of peace. Many of the details of that controversy read amazingly like Europe now.—V.N.]

Kentucky Threatens to Seek English Aid

When these [Spanish] threats were heard in America, there was great excitement everywhere, but it assumed opposite phases in the north and in the south. The merchants of New York and Boston cared little more about the Mississippi River than about Timbuctoo, but they were extremely anxious to see a commercial treaty concluded with Spain. On the other hand, the backwoodsmen of Kentucky and the state of Franklin [Tenn.] cared nothing for the trade on the ocean, but they would not sit still while their corn and their pork were confiscated on the way to New Orleans. . . .

Indignation meetings were held in Kentucky. The people threatened to send a force of militia down the river and capture Natchez and New Orleans; and a more dangerous threat was made. Should the northeastern states desert them . . . they vowed they would secede, and throw themselves upon Great Britain for protection.

On the other hand, there was great agitation in the seaboard towns of Massachusetts. They were disgusted with the backwoodsmen for making such a fuss about nothing, and with the people of the southern states for aiding and abetting them; and during this turbulent summer of 1786, many persons were heard to declare that, in case Jay's suggestion [for a compromise] should not be adopted, it would be high time for the New England states to secede from the Union, and form a confederation by themselves. The situation was dangerous in the extreme.

[NOTE: Here follow some pages concerning the initiative taken by Washington in getting Maryland and Virginia to appoint commissioners for a common consideration of the better navigation of the Potomac. One major purpose was to facilitate the shipment of the products of the trans-Allegheny regions to the outside world without use of the lower Mississippi.

Later, through a series of developments all the colonies were invited to send delegates to a meeting at Annapolis to discuss general economic issues. For a long time, our forefathers drifted blindfolded toward union. It is most earnestly to be hoped that some of the thcroughly disheartening half-measures of our day may similarly be leading us toward world union. The nearness to which we got chaos rather than unification in the 1780's should prevent any degree of complacency as we watch our nations founder so helplessly in their unseaworthy U.N. Again here, the compiler would earnestly urge interested readers to get Fiske's book and read the whole story.—V.N.]

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Only Five States Appear at Annapolis

The seed dropped by Washington had fallen on fruitful soil . . . yet when the convention was gathered at Annapolis . . . the outlook was most discouraging. . . . Massachusetts and New Hampshire, Rhode Island and North Carolina, had duly appointed commissioners, but they were not there . . . and no action had been taken by [Maryland] Georgia, South Carolina or Connecticut. With only five states represented. the commissioners did not think it worth

while to go on with their work. But before adjourning they adopted an address, written by Alexander Hamilton, and sent it to all the states. . . . New Jersey had taken a step in advance, and instructed her delegates "to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations *and other important matters* might be necessary to the common interest and permanent harmony of the several states." *And other important matters*—thus again was the weightiest part of the business relegated to a subordinate clause! So gingerly was the great question—so dreaded, yet so inevitable—approached! . . .

The report of the commissioners was brought before Congress . . . in the hope that Congress would earnestly recommend to the several states the course of action therein suggested. But . . . a convention was an irregular body, which had no right to propose changes in the organic law of the land, and the state legislatures could not properly confirm the acts of such a body. . . . These arguments were pleasing to the self-love of Congress, and it refused to sanction the plan of the Annapolis commissioners.

New Jersey "Breaks the Camel's Back"

In an ordinary season this would perhaps have ended the matter, but the winter of 1786-87 was not an ordinary season. All the troubles . . . seemed to culminate just at this moment. The paper-money craze in so many of the states, the shameful deeds of Rhode Island, the riots in Vermont and New Hampshire, the Shays rebellion in Massachusetts, the dispute with Spain, and the consequent imminent danger of separation between north and south had all come together; and the feeling of thoughtful men and women throughout the country was one of real consternation.

The last ounce was now to be put upon the camel's back in the failure of the impost amendment . . . to endow Congress with the power of levying customs duties; . . . By the summer of 1786, after endless wrangling, twelve states had consented to the amendment. But . . . unanimous consent was necessary. The one delinquent state, which thus blocked the wheels of the confederacy, was New York. She had her little system of duties all nicely arranged for what seemed to be her own interests, and she would not surrender

this system to Congress. Upon the neighboring states her tariff system bore hard, and especially upon New Jersey. In 1786 this little state flatly refused to pay her quota of [national] expenses until New York should stop discriminating against her trade. Nothing which occurred in that troubled year caused more alarm than this, for it could not be denied that such a declaration seemed little less than an act of secession on the part of New Jersey. . . . There now seemed nothing left for Congress to do but adopt the recommendation of the Annapolis commissioners and give its sanction to the proposed convention. . . .

The events of the year had worked a change in the popular sentiment in Virginia; people were more afraid of anarchy, and not quite so much afraid of centralization; and now, under Madison's lead, Virginia played her trump card and chose George Washington as one of her delegates. As soon as this was known, there was an outburst of joy throughout the land. All at once the people began everywhere to feel an interest in the proposed convention, and presently Massachusetts changed her attitude. Up to this time Massachusetts had been as obstinate in her assertion of local independence . . . as any of the thirteen states, except New York and Rhode Island. But the Shays rebellion had served as a useful object lesson. . . . Every week saw fresh converts to the party which called for a stronger government. . . . Of the thirteen states, Rhode Island alone refused to take any part in the proceedings.

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"Let Us Raise a Standard," Said Washington

Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and Richard Henry Lee disapproved of the convention, and remained at home. . . . John Jay . . . had not been sent to the convention, because New York did not wish to have it succeed. Along with Hamilton, New York sent two commonplace men, Robert Yates and John Lansing, who were extreme and obstinate anti-federalists. Some of the delegates came with the design of simply amending the articles of confederation by taking away from the states the power of regulating commerce. . . . Others felt that if the work were not done thoroughly now

another chance might never be offered; and these men thought it necessary to abolish the confederation and establish a federal republic, in which the general government should act directly upon the people.

The difficult problem was how to frame a plan of this sort—which people could be made to understand and adopt. . . . It was suggested that palliatives and half measures would be far more likely to find favor with the people than any thorough-going reform, when Washington suddenly interposed with a brief but immortal speech. . . . Rising from his president's chair . . . he exclaimed in tones unwontedly solemn with suppressed emotion,

> *"It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair; the event is in the hand of God."*

From that moment the mood in which they worked caught something from the glorious spirit of Washington. There was need of such high purpose, for two plans were presently laid before the meeting, which, for the moment, brought out one of the chief elements of antagonism existing between the states, and which at first seemed irreconcilable.

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[NOTE: Our federal union started with grave imperfections on which we are still working. This analogy is now often cited as justification for trusting the U.N. to work its way out of chaotic anarchy toward order. But this is a misleading Q.E.D. from an improper equation. Our *union* had from its first day the minimum in adequacy which was required. It had a constitution rather than a collection of promissory notes (such as a charter or covenant contains.) Progressive improvement was therefore possible. The same leaders and people were not able to secure any progress under their Articles of Confederation to which the U.N. Charter is properly comparable. Quite the contrary, indeed; there was steady retrogression. Madison's "Minutes" and the Federalist as well as Fiske are especially suggestive reading on these points. —V.N.]

The moribund Congress of the Confederation . . . was more a diplomatic than a legislative body. . . . To substitute abruptly for

such a body a truly national legislature, based not upon states but upon population, was quietly to inaugurate a revolution of no less magnitude than that which had lately severed us from Great Britain. . . . To the familiar state governments which had so long possessed their love and allegiance, it was super-adding a new and untried government, which it was feared would swallow up the states and everywhere extinguish local independence.

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"We Might As Well Go Home"

The great mind of Madison was one of the first to entertain distinctly the noble conception of two kinds of government operating at one and the same time upon the same individuals, harmonious with each other, but each supreme in its own sphere. Such is the fundamental conception of our . . . government. . . . It took a good deal of discussion to make it clear to the minds of the delegates generally; and the struggle over this initial measure . . . was so bitter as to come near breaking up the convention. . . . An audacious scheme! exclaimed some of the delegates. It was enough to take you breath away. If they were going to begin like this, they might as well go home, for all discussion would be time wasted. . . .

The debate on the merits of the question was an angry one. According to the Virginia plan, said Brearly, the three states of Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania will carry everything before them. . . . Was it fair, on the other hand, that Georgia should have an equal vote with Virginia? He would not say it was. What remedy, then? One only: that a map of the United States be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into thirteen equal parts. . . .

Paterson [of New Jersey] went on to say, . . . "Shall I submit the welfare of New Jersey with five votes in a council where Virginia has sixteen? I will never consent to the proposed plan." Paterson was ably answered by James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, who pointed out the absurdity of giving 180,000 men in one part of the country as much weight in the national legislature as 750,000 in another part. It is unjust, he said. "The gentleman from New

Jersey is candid. . . . I commend him for it. I will be equally candid. . . . I will never confederate on his principles."

The convention grew nervous and excited over this seemingly irreconcilable antagonism. . . . Gunning Bedford, of Delaware, was especially violent. *"Gentlemen, I do not trust you.* If you possess the power, the abuse of it could not be checked; and what then would prevent you from exercising it to our destruction? . . . Sooner than be ruined, *there are foreign powers who will take us by the hand."* . . . The situation had become dangerous. "The convention," said Martin, "was on the verge of dissolution, scarce held together by the strength of a hair."

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[NOTE: Delegates from Connecticut are traditionally given chief credit for a proposal which finally was adopted, though its essential features had been suggested from time to time previously by many others. It was that the states have equal voting powers in the Senate, but representation in proportion to population in the lower house. Some such plan in a federal world government will doubtless allay misgivings concerning domination of a world parliament by any group of nations, large or small.

Most authorities today, however, favor a unicameral world congress with a "weighted" system of representation, based upon a variety of additional factors beside population. Perhaps the best-known plan for this purpose is the one drawn up by Dr. H. F. Rudd of the University of New Hampshire. While the compiler believes such a plan to be entirely feasible, it is his judgment that the nations will follow the American plan. It has been adopted by every other federal union, except Canada, as each met this difficulty. It guards the big against the little, quite as much as the little against the big.

Though found in every federal system except one, the bi-cameral legislature with the two types of representation is not the most distinctive element in federalism. The basic factor is maintenance within a sovereign nation-state of substantial degrees of sovereignty for the constituent member-states. This is a federated *union;* out of that fact came the term, a *federal* union. Our American founding fathers liked the phrase, "co-ordinate sovereignty."—V.N.]

A Close Call on a Crucial Vote

The famous Connecticut compromise led the way to the arrangement which was ultimately adopted. . . . But at first the compromise met with little favor. . . . When the question as to allowing equality of suffrage to the states in the Federal Senate was put to vote, the result was a tie. . . . It was Abraham Baldwin, a native of Connecti-

cut and . . . a recent emigrant to Georgia, who thus divided the vote of that state, and prevented a decision which would in all probability have broken up the convention. . . . The moral effect of the tie vote was in favor of the Connecticut compromise; for no one could doubt that the little states, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, had they been represented in the division, would have voted on that side. . . . A timely speech from Madison soothed the troubled waters; but it was only after eleven days of . . . debate that the compromise was adopted. Even then it was but narrowly secured . . . [five states to four, with Massachusetts delegation split. All votes in the constitutional convention were taken by states, not by individuals, and the unit rule prevailed.—V.N.]

The plan, as now reported, omitted the obnoxious adjective "national," and spoke of the *federal* legislature and of the *federal* courts. But to the men who were still blindly wedded to the old confederation this soothing change of phraseology did not conceal their defeat. . . . Yates and Lansing quit the convention in disgust, and went home to New York. . . . Martin, whose wrath had waxed hotter every day, as he saw power after power extended to the federal government, . . . went back to Maryland, vowing that he would have nothing more to do with such high-handed proceedings.

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One Vicious Compromise Not Avoidable

A Federal Constitution had not only to be framed, but it had to be presented to the thirteen states for adoption. It was by no means clear that enough states would ratify it to enable the experiment of the new government to go into operation. New York and Rhode Island were known to be bitterly opposed to it; Massachusetts could not be counted on as sure; to add South Carolina to this list [by insisting upon counting white persons only as population] would be to endanger everything. The event justified this caution. We shall hereafter see that . . . but for her ratification, coming just at the moment when it did, the work of the Federal Convention would probably have been done in vain.

It was a clear perception of the wonderful complication of in-

terests involved in the final appeal to the people that induced the Virginia statesmen to take the lead in a compromise. . . . It was agreed that in counting population, whether for direct taxation or for representation in the lower house of Congress, five slaves should be reckoned as three individuals. All this was thoroughly illogical, of course; ... it was easy for James Wilson to show that there was neither rhyme nor reason in it; but he subscribed to it, nevertheless, just as the northern abolitionists . . . joined with Washington and Madison, and with the pro-slavery Pinckneys, in subscribing to it, because they all believed that without such a compromise the Constitution would not be adopted; and in this there can be little doubt that they were right.

The evil consequences were unquestionably very serious indeed. . . . Admitting all this, however, it remains undeniable that the Constitution saved us from anarchy; and there can be little doubt that slavery and every other remnant of barbarism in American society would have thriven far more lustily under a state of chronic anarchy than was possible under the Constitution. Four years of concentrated warfare, . . . could not hurt the character nor mar the fortunes of the people like a century of aimless and miscellaneous squabbling over a host of petty local interests. . . . The War of Secession was a terrible ordeal to pass through; but when one tries to picture what might have happened in this fair land without the work of the Federal Convention, the imagination stands aghast.

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[NOTE: The now somewhat absurd electoral college system for the election of presidents arose partly from a distrust of popular government and partly from an attempt to keep more power in the hands of the states as such. The more democratic among the American founding fathers had to be content with the best they could get within reason, and then trust the powers of democracy, to "march," as they did. We, too, must be prepared to accept an imperfect system of world government and then continue to work earnestly for its steady improvement. But, as has been stressed explicitly in a previous annotation, we must (in Stassen's phrase) win a bridgehead we can hold. Otherwise we shall not be able to march on; we shall slip back toward the abyss of a third world war dwarfing the other two in both horror and destruction. —V.N.]

Some Leaders Preferred Risks of Anarchy

When the great document was at last drafted, the aged Franklin

produced a paper, which was read for him, as his voice was weak. Some parts of the Constitution, he said, he did not approve, but he was astonished to find it so nearly perfect. Whatever opinion he had of its errors he would sacrifice to the public good, and he hoped that every member of the convention who still had objections would on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and for the sake of unanimity put his name to this instrument. Hamilton added his plea. A few members, he said, by refusing to sign, might do infinite mischief. . . . Was it possible for a true patriot to deliberate between anarchy and convulsion, on the one side, and the chance of good to be expected from this plan, on the other? From these appeals, as well as from Washington's solemn warning at the outset, we see how distinctly it was realized that the country was on the verge of civil war. . . . There were three who dreaded despotism even more than anarchy. Mason, Randolph and Gerry refused to sign. . . . Though few were really satisfied, the approach to unanimity was remarkable.

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Great Revolutionary Figures Opposed Union

The forces of the opposition were promptly mustered. At their head was Richard Henry Lee, who eleven years before had moved in Congress the Declaration of Independence. He was ably supported by Nathan Dane of Massachusetts, and the delegation from New York were unanimous in their determination to obstruct any movement toward a close union of the states. . . . And now there ensued such a war of pamphlets, broadsides, caricatures, squibs, and stump-speeches, as had never yet been seen in America . . . . What was the matter with the old confederation? asked the Antifederalists. Had it not conducted a glorious and triumphant war? . . . That there was some trouble now in the country could not be denied, but all would be right if people would only curb their extravagance, wear homespun clothes, and obey the laws. There was government enough in the country already. . . . *You might be sure there was a British cloven foot in it somewhere.*. . . . (Italics by compiler.)

Then there were Hamilton and Madison, mere boys; and Franklin, an old dotard, a man in his second childhood. And as to Wash-

ington, he was doubtless a good soldier, but what did he know about politics? So said the more moderate of the malcontents, hesitating for the moment to speak disrespectfully of such a man; but presently their zeal got the better of them and in a paper signed "Centinel" it was boldly declared that Washington was a born fool! . . . Beyond the Susquehanna there were threats of armed rebellion.

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[NOTE: Despite demagoguery and reactionary isolationism, the constitution was swiftly ratified by unanimous votes in Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia. The vote in Pennsylvania's ratification convention was 46-23 and in Connecticut's 128-40. Those five were the only states in which there were both swift and one-sided victories. The entire country then seemed to settle back to await the issue in Massachusetts. It is difficult to see how one can question the remarkable parallels between that time and this after a reading of the fuller accounts of the debate for and against adherence to the proposed new union in that state. The central issue the world now faces was confronted on a smaller scale by 355 citizens of Massachusetts in their ratification convention. Many arguments out of the sections which immediately follow have been repeatedly expressed for and against world federal union in recent years, and in almost identical language.—V.N.]

A Long Fight in Massachusetts Convention

The hopes of the Antifederalists now rested upon Massachusetts.... Should Massachusetts refuse to ratify, there would be no hope for the Constitution. Even should nine states adopt it without her, no one supposed a Federal Union feasible from which so great a state should be excluded. Her action, too, would have marked effect upon other states. It could not be denied that the outlook in Massachusetts was far from encouraging. The embers of the Shays rebellion still smouldered there. . . . Laws impairing the obligation of contracts were just what these hard-pressed farmers desired, and by the proposed Constitution all such laws were forever prohibited.

The people of the district of Maine . . . were anxious to set up an independent government for themselves; and they feared that if they were to enter into the new and closer Federal Union as part of that state, they might thereafter find it impossible to detach themselves. . . . In none of the thirteen states, moreover, was there a more intense devotion to state rights than in Massachusetts. . . .

They believed it to be all-important that people should manage their own affairs . . .; and so far had this principle been carried that the towns of Massachusetts were like little semi-independent republics. . . . To men trained in such a school it would naturally seem that the new Constitution delegated altogether too much power to a governing body which must necessarily be remote from most of its constituents. . . . Such fears were entertained by one of the greatest citizens that Massachusetts has ever produced—Samuel Adams. . . . Amid balancing considerations he found it for some time hard to make up his mind. . . .

Typical Arguments Against the New Union

The [Mass.] convention began by overhauling [the Constitution] from beginning to end. . . . Some of the objections seem odd to us at this time, with our larger experience. . . . There was the vague dread that in some indescribable way the new Congress might contrive to make its sitting perpetual, and thus become a tyrannical oligarchy, which might tax the people without their consent. And then as to this federal city . . . a district ten miles square! Was not that a great space to give up to the uncontrolled discretion of the federal government? One of the delegates thought he could be reconciled to the new Constitution if this district could only be narrowed down to one mile square. . . .

A standing army, of which the president was to be ex officio commander-in-chief. Did not this open the door for a Cromwell? . . . A militia, organized under the town-meeting system, was surely all-sufficient. . . . Had not an army of militia surrounded and captured an army of regulars led by one of England's most skillful officers? . . . Then it was very doubtful whether the people could support the expense of an elaborate federal government.

A Berkshire Farmer Outdoes the Orators

During the whole course of the discussion, observed the Rev. Samuel West of New Bedford, it seemed to be taken for granted that the federal government was going to be put into the hands of crafty knaves. "I wish," he said, "that the gentlemen who have stated so many *possible* objections would try to show us that what

they so much deprecate is *probable*. . . . Because power *may* be abused, shall we be reduced to anarchy?" . . . The feeling of distrust was strongest among the farmers. . . . They objected, not so much to the Constitution as to the men who made it and the men who sang its praises. They hated lawyers, and were jealous of wealthy merchants. . . :

A more liberal-minded farmer, Jonathan Smith of Lanesborough, rose to reply: . . . "Suppose you had a farm of 50 acres, and your title was disputed, and there was a farm of 5,000 acres joined to you that belonged to a man of learning, and his title was involved in the same difficulty; would you not be glad to have him for your friend, rather than to stand alone in the dispute? . . . Suppose two or three of you had been at the pains to break up a piece of rough land and sow it with wheat: would you let it lie waste because you could not agree what sort of fence to make? Would it not be better to put up a fence that did not please everyone's fancy, rather than keep disputing about it until the wild beasts came in and devoured the crop?"

Rest of Country Waits for Massachusetts

It may be doubted whether all the eloquence of Fisher Ames could have stated the case more forcibly than it was put by this plain farmer from the Berkshire hills. . . . For the first two weeks, Samuel Adams scarcely opened his mouth, but listened with anxious care to everything that was said on either side. The convention was so evenly divided that there could be no doubt that his single voice would decide the result. . . . So profound was the faith of this intelligent and skeptical and independent people in the sound judgment and unswerving integrity of the Father of the Revolution. . . .

Not only were people from New Hampshire and New York and . . . Rhode Island waiting anxiously about Boston to catch every crumb of news they could get, but intrigues were going on, as far south as Virginia, to influence the result. On the 21st of January the "Boston Gazette" came out with a warning, headed by enormous capitals with three exclamation points: "Bribery and

Corruption ! ! ! The most diabolical plan is on foot to corrupt the members of the convention who oppose the adoption of the new Constitution. Large sums of money have been brought from a neighboring state for that purpose, contributed by the wealthy." . . . What was undeniable was that Richard Henry Lee wrote a letter to Gerry, urging that Massachusetts should not adopt the Constitution without insisting upon sundry amendments; and in order to consider these amendments, it was suggested that there should be another Federal Convention.

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At this anxious crisis, Washington suddenly threw himself into the breach with that infallible judgment of his which always saw the way to victory. "If another Federal Convention is attempted," said Washington, "its members will be more discordant, and will agree upon no general plan. The Constitution is the best that can be obtained at this time. . . . The Constitution or disunion are before us to choose from. If the Constitution is our choice, a constitutional door is open for amendments, and they may be adopted in a peaceable manner, without tumult or disorder."

Massachusetts Comes in by a 187-168 Vote

When this advice of Washington's reached Boston, it set in motion a train of events which soon solved the difficulty, both for Massachusetts and for the other states which had not yet made up their minds. Chief among the objections to the Constitution had been the fact that it did not contain a bill of rights. . . . The friends of the Constitution in Boston now proposed that the convention, while adopting it, should suggest sundry amendments containing the essential provisions of a bill of rights. . . . The hearty support of Adams was immediately insured, and within a week from that time . . . the Constitution was ratified by the narrow majority of 187 votes against 168.

On that same day Jefferson, in Paris, wrote to Madison: "I wish with all my soul that the nine first conventions may accept the new Constitution, to secure to us the good it contains; but I equally wish that the four latest, whichever they may be, may refuse

to accede to it till a declaration of rights be annexed; but no objection to the new form must produce a schism in our Union." But as soon as he [Jefferson] heard of the action of Massachusetts, he approved it as preferable to his own idea, and he wrote home urging Virginia to follow the example.

Patrick Henry Bitterly Opposed to Union

All the winter Patrick Henry had been busily at work, with the hope of inducing the southern states to establish a separate confederacy; but he had made little headway anywhere, and none at all in Maryland, where his influence was completely counteracted by that of Washington. . . . After a session of five days the Constitution was ratified by a vote of 63 to 11. . . . The eyes of the whole country were now turned upon the eighth state, South Carolina. . . . The most active of the Antifederalists was Rawlins Lowndes, who . . . was betrayed into silliness. "We are now," said he, "under a most excellent constitution—a blessing from Heaven, that has stood the test of time, and given us liberty and independence; yet we are impatient to pull down that fabric which we raised at the expense of our blood." This was not very convincing to the assembly, most of the members knowing full well that the fabric had not stood the test of time, but had already tumbled in by reason of its vicious construction. . . . Lowndes then sounded the alarm that the New England states would monopolize the carrying trade and charge ruinous freights. . . . But Pinckney rejoined that a Yankee shipmaster in quest of cargoes would not be likely to ruin his own chances for getting them. . . . After a session of eleven days, South Carolina ratified the Constitution by a vote of 149 against 73.

Virginia Becomes Number 10 by Majority of 10

The sound policy of the Federal Convention in adopting the odious compromise over the slave-trade was now about to bear fruit. In Virginia there had grown up a party which favored the establishment of a separate southern confederacy. By the action of South Carolina all such schemes were now nipped in the bud. Of the states south of Mason and Dixon's line, three had now ratified the Constitution so that a separate confederacy could now consist

only of Virginia and North Carolina. The reason for this short-lived separatist feeling in Virginia was to be found in the complications which had grown out of the attempt of Spain to close the Mississippi River. . . . If the New England people were thus ready to barter away the vital interests of a remote part of the country, what might they not do? Would they ever stop at anything so long as they could go on building up their commerce? . . .

Foremost among the Antifederalists was Patrick Henry, whose eloquence was now as zealously employed against the new government as it had been in bygone days against the usurpations of Great Britain. He was supported by Mason, Lee, and Grayson, as well as by Benjamin Harrison and John Tyler, the fathers of two future presidents. . . . But the united talents of the opposition had no chance of success in a conflict with the genius and tact of Madison. . . . After more than three weeks of debate. . . . the Constitution was ratified by the narrow majority of 89 against 79. . . . The discussion had lasted so long that Virginia lost the distinction of being the ninth state to ratify the Constitution. That honor had been reserved for New Hampshire whose convention . . . after a four day's session . . . had given its consent to the new government by a vote of 57 against 46. . . . The 4th of July, 1788, witnessed such loud rejoicings as have perhaps never been seen before or since on American soil.

New York Still Wants None of It

The difficulties were not yet surmounted, and the rejoicing was in some respects premature. It was now settled that the new government was to go into operation, but how it was going to be able to get along without the adhesion of New York it was not easy to see. . . . So strongly were people impressed with this feeling that some went so far as to threaten violence . . . if New York did not come into the Union peacefully and of her own accord, she should be conquered and dragged in. That she would come in peacefully seemed at first very improbable. . . . Upon their return from the Federal Convention, Yates and Lansing had done all in their power to bring its proceedings into ill-repute. . . . The Constitution was called the "triple-headed monster," and declared to be "as deep

and wicked a conspiracy as ever was invented in the darkest ages against the liberties of a free people." It soon occurred to Hamilton that it would be well worth while to explain the meaning of all parts of the Constitution in a series of short, incisive essays. He communicated his plan to Madison and Jay, who joined him in the work, and the result was the "Federalist."

☆ ☆ ☆

Hamilton Finally Brings New York In, 30-27

When it came to defending the Constitution before the hostile convention at Poughkeepsie, he had before him as arduous a task as ever fell to the lot of a parliamentary debater. . . . The opposition were too numerous to be silenced, or cajoled, or bargained with. They must be converted. With an eloquence scarcely equalled . . . Hamilton argued week after week, till at last Melanchthon Smith, the foremost debater of Clinton's party, broke away, and came to the Federalist side. It was like crushing the center of a hostile army. . . .

The decisive struggle was over the question whether New York could ratify the Constitution conditionally. . . . Upon this point, Hamilton reinforced himself with the advice of Madison. . . . Madison's reply was prompt and decisive. . . . A state which had once ratified was in the federal bond forever. . . . There could be no such thing as a constitutional right of secession. When Melanchthon Smith deserted the Antifederalists on this point, the victory was won, and . . . New York ratified the Constitution by the bare majority of 30 votes against 27. . . .

With the adhesion of New York all serious anxiety came to an end. The new government could be put in operation without waiting for North Carolina and Rhode Island to make up their minds. . . . It was not until the 21st of November, 1789, after Washington's government had been several months in operation, that North Carolina joined the Federal Union. Rhode Island did not join till the 29th of May, 1790 [and even then by a majority of only two, 34 to 32]. If she had waited but a few months longer, Vermont, the first state not of the original thirteen, would have come in before her.

Only Ten States Elected Washington

The autumn of 1788 was a season of busy but peaceful electioneering. . . . The Antifederalists were still potent for mischief in New York, with the result that, just as that state had not joined in the Declaration of Independence until after it had been proclaimed to the world, and just as she had refused to adopt the Federal Constitution until after more than the requisite number of states had ratified it, so now she failed to choose electors, and had nothing to do with the vote that made Washington our first president. The other ten states that had ratified the Constitution all chose electors. . . . There were 69 in all, and every one of the 69 was found to be for George Washington of Virginia.

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The position to which he was summoned was one of unparalleled splendor. . . . As he journeyed toward New York, his thoughts must have been busy with the arduous problems of his time. Already, doubtless, he had marked out the two great men, Jefferson and Hamilton, for his chief advisers; the one to place us in a proper attitude before the mocking nations of Europe; the other to restore our shattered credit, and enlist the moneyed interests of all the states in the success of the Federal Union. Washington's temperament was a hopeful one, as befitted a man of his strength and dash. But in his most hopeful mood he could hardly have dared to count upon such a sudden and wonderful demonstration of national strength as was about to ensue.



Some Specific Parallels

By VERNON NASH

THE closing paragraph of Fiske's "Critical Period" points the way to succeeding volumes on the early history of the new Republic. An amazing burst of prosperity with increasingly peaceful relations among the states immediately followed Washington's inauguration. *No other internal change* than the ending of interstate anarchy by the establishment of a common government was sufficient to account for this astounding transformation.

It is true that conditions abroad enabled the new nation to reap huge revenues in customs duties from a carrying and trans-shipment trade to and from the West Indies. This helped enormously by keeping down hated federal taxations upon the masses. Such benefits, however, could have been secured only by a strong central government. Cut-throat competition among independent states would have destroyed the profits.

In virtually every respect the great hopes of the advocates of a more perfect union were soon exceeded. The same thing will follow the establishment of a federal world government in our time.

This confidence is strengthened by noting the many ways in which conditions today in the relations among the nations parallel those among the American states in the 1780's. There are differences, of course, but before dismissing any of the examples on that score alone, the reader would do well to study the subject further.

Research has modified many details of Fiske's presentation, or the emphasis he placed upon them, but the general outlines of the picture drawn by him are accurate. This fact can be verified by anyone in five minutes by consulting the appropriate paragraphs in the history sections of articles on the United States in the latest editions of standard encyclopædias.

The following parallels are tentatively suggested as being broadly valid and vitally significant for our day:

They, Too, Thought It Couldn't Be Done

Pessimism and defeatism in 1783 were as great as they are today. It would have been as difficult for men then to foresee Washington taking his first oath of office under a federal constitution six years later as it is today for most persons to imagine a federal world government in operation during the 1940's.

Absolute Sovereignty Breeder of Wars

The worsening of general conditions was accompanied proportionately by threats of war, by war-like disputes, and by the menace of military usurpations. "Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained," declared Washington in the early days of the constitutional convention itself, and it is clear that he meant war *among* the states. There can surely no longer be any doubt on this crucial point: war is inherent in *any* system of absolutely sovereign states and *cannot* be prevented.

Violence is almost certain to break out whenever human relations are quite inequitable, if peaceable means of altering unjust conditions are either unavailable or are not used. War will continue to curse humanity so long as nations have the recognized right and possess the power to do whatever they think necessary in their own interest without regard to the effect of their actions upon the safety and welfare of other peoples. It has become as indefensible and as menacing to permit nations to retain their private armies as it is to let ranch kings, or industries, or political parties, do so.

Unqualified Loyalty to One's Own State

Patriotism was generally thought to require unqualified allegiance to one's own state; to many it seemed disloyal and subversive to work for a strong national union of all the states. That fact is almost unimaginable today, but is it any more rational for nationalists now to denounce as unpatriotic one who strives for the establishment of a federal world government?

Citizens of Other States "Foreigners"

The mass of the people in each state *felt* as remote from and as distinctly separate from the peoples of other states as do national

groupings today. It was not conceivable to most persons that a strong central government could exist without the complete destruction of cherished local institutions and particular cultures. What sound reasons have we for assuming that a federal world government will or could destroy nationality? It would qualify only the absoluteness of present nationalisms. Scotland has had no sovereignty whatever for centuries, yet Scots remain just as Scotch as ever. The same is true of the Welsh, Walloons, Basques, and many other racial and linguistic minorities throughout the world. Hence we can be positively certain that nations which do keep internal sovereignties unimpaired will also preserve their nationalities, no matter how close our union on a world level may become in matters of common concern.

Isolationists Had Innings Then Also

Some of the most able and high-minded men of the time were what we would now call isolationists, only the political boundaries within which they sought self-sufficiency were those of a single state. New York's actions among the thirteen states anticipated, in important respects, the obstructive and uncooperative position often taken by the United States among the nations between World War I and World War II. The follies of unwarranted protectionism turned inward upon their creators. They always do, as we are seeing today in the virtual tariffs which have been maintained by many of the American states against each other. The logic of "Buy American" turns first into "Buy Nebraska" or "Buy Oregon" and thence into "Buy Podunk." The ultimate logical end would be attempts to create entirely self-sufficient families again.

Presumed Self-Interest Defeats Own Ends

Most of the rest of the country felt toward the northeastern states as so many Americans now feel toward Europe. New Englanders were thought decadent by frontiersmen, and were suspected of imperialistic readiness to sell them (in a quite literal sense) "down the river." The chief menace to freedom, therefore, then as now, was not the strength of its enemies but the divisions among free men arising out of their own short-sighted selfishness. As always,

concentration upon what men thought was their own self-interest defeated its own ends. Thus unqualified sovereignty becomes quite as suicidal as it is grossly immoral.

Shays' Rebellion Their Atomic Bomb

It may be questioned whether enough honor has yet been given to John Shays for his part in bringing about the creation of the U.S.A. The rebellion led by him was a spontaneous outburst of farmers and others upon whom the chaotic conditions bore most heavily. It became plain to the more thoughtful everywhere that such disorder would sweep from the Berkshires through the entire country if something adequate were not speedily done to restore trade, establish a dependable currency, etc. When the authorities of Massachusetts beseeched Washington to come up to their state and lend his influence to the restoring of order after Shays' Rebellion had been suppressed, Washington sent back his famous reply: "Influence is not government."

Radicalism of Masses in New England Feared

The propertied classes of the Middle Atlantic and Southern states were apprehensive of closer union with the "levellers" of Massachusetts. "General Knox wrote Washington that New England had twelve or fifteen thousand desperate men who held what would now be called Communist views." (cf. Nevins and Commager, "Pocket History of the United States," p. 120.) The governments of these states remained conservative but among the people were powerful movements to the left. Shays' Rebellion was a major manifestation of this unrest. Union would make it easier for these disaffections to spread to other states, or so it was feared. Is not all this broadly comparable to the distrust which is now widely felt concerning Russia?

Boundaries Determined Likes and Hates

The prejudices, suspicions and jealousies of Americans toward other Americans often had no more natural foundations than do those of one group of human beings toward other groups in the world today. They existed among rival political entities, irrespective of similarities and differences. Highly dangerous consequences thus

flowed, as they do now, from what are essentially artificial creations of man, that is, from political boundary lines around absolute sovereignties.

Best "Horse-Traders" Sent to Conferences

There was a natural tendency to send men to inter-state conferences and to the Continental Congress who were shrewd and obstinate bargainers rather than cooperative statesmen. Is it possible under any purely collaborative system to secure a sufficient number of delegates who will act in the interests of all? Federal unions have succeeded remarkably well, on the whole, in this respect, despite serious difficulties with unwarranted manifestations of regionalism at recurring intervals.

"Patching" Solutions, as Ever, Were Popular

Whenever issues became critical, there was talk of political realignments and of foreign alliances. As soon as Jay's trade treaty with Spain was shelved because the Spanish demanded full control of the lower Mississippi, agitation became general in New England for a separate confederacy of the northeastern states only. The rational and most practical solution was delayed for years chiefly because it was mistakenly presumed to be "impossible." The error was discovered when the wise and honest were given a standard by the Constitutional Convention round which they could rally. The world must have such a standard now. It can best be provided by a world constitutional convention. If we cannot secure authorization for an official gathering for this purpose within a reasonable time, then from all lands like-minded private citizens of competence should convene in a "model" session, as was done in Australia in the 1890's. Such a convention would, of course, have no function except its propaganda effect.

They Had Their Full Share of Demagogues

Demagogic appeals to the past flourished, coupled with "patriotic" devotion to purely sectional interests. Today's equivalent in all lands are the chauvinistic flag-wavers. Why should provincialism now be a disparaging term but patriotism (even in perverted extremes) be exalted by many as the highest of all virtues?

Rival Governments in Tennessee for Years

An organized government of the "State of Franklin" challenged the authority of North Carolina in the Tennessee territory for four years. The trans-Allegheny areas as well as Maine and Vermont were the equivalents of our modern Philippines, Ireland, Spain, Iran, Poland, India, etc. Controversies and disputes about such matters swiftly were handled acceptably by the new union government. Consultations and collaborations, however valuable they may be in their place, cannot take the place of government.

The Other Fellow Is Always to Blame

Troubles of all kinds were attributed to the follies and iniquities of *other* states; one's own state, of course, was always rational and noble. As usual, indignations were in inverse proportion to responsibilities for a given situation. Admonitions to others were most popular; the setting of an example was seldom favorably considered by many.

Some Wanted to Cross Chasm in Two Jumps

As recognition slowly gained way that the claims of rival sovereignties *cannot* be reconciled without some common political agency *empowered* to resolve them, the advantages of lesser regional unions were pressed at that time, especially those of a separate southern confederacy. Thus today many would make their start toward world government by way of various types of regionalism in spheres of influence, or by lesser unions in these regions.

"Must Divide U.S. into Thirteen Equal Parts"

At the other extreme, as with us, there were those in the Post-Revolutionary period who believed that it must be all or nothing from the very beginning. Even Hamilton's address to the states, adopted by the Annapolis commissioners, took care to provide that any proposals which might be made by a convention must secure *universal* adherence before becoming effective. One delegate to the constitutional convention seriously insisted that no action was possible unless they first re-apportioned the territory of the United States into thirteen equal parts.

They Wouldn't "Cooperate with Inevitable"

The "dreaded inevitable" (Fiske's words) was approached very gingerly, with continued urgings of palliatives and half-measures. We are urged now, as were the early Americans, to trust methods whose inadequacy has been proved up to the hilt in all man's history. We do not need to jump off a cliff to *know* that the law of gravity works with certainty at all times.

So with leagues and confederations, all such loose associations of fully sovereign states. Their futility is to be predicted with absolute confidence. A dependable world order cannot be built on voluntary commitments which each nation is able to cancel at any time. A successfully functioning order cannot be maintained in disparate parts. Important phases of our international life are too integrated, inter-related and inter-dependent to be administered through fractional economic agencies or by any degree of mere cooperation among fully independent units.

The Option—Anarchy or Union

The thirteen states did not flow like quicksilver into their more perfect union. There was not only strong opposition to any strong central government; it was also exceedingly difficult to obtain agreement on details even among those who fully recognized the impelling need of such government. The adoption of the constitution at all was made possible only by the temporary toleration of features which were illogical and morally indefensible. These had tragic results but it is doubtful if the aftermaths were remotely comparable in evil effect to perpetuation of universal anarchy.

Not Always a "Parthenon of Statesmanship"

The constitutional instrument which Americans now so greatly revere was viewed with the utmost repugnance by at least a very large minority, if not by an actual majority, when it was first submitted. So strong was the opposition that only ten states participated in the first presidential election. New York obstructionists prevented the choice of electors in that state; North Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet ratified.

"According to Your Faith, Be It Unto You"

Our founding fathers exhibited an astounding faith in the attractiveness and in the manifest values of union (once it could begin to function). They did so when they provided that the U.S.A. would be created as soon as *any* nine of the original thirteen states had ratified. The selection of that minimum figure meant that they were prepared to make the attempt, if necessary, without the initial adherence of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia. If they felt that the presence within the union of at least one of the Big Powers was vital, why in the name of all that was sensible did they not make that required figure *ten* instead of nine?

It has been argued that they did not do this because they knew "of course" that the "Big Four" would ratify. They knew nothing of the kind. The odds looked very poor. Sam Adams, "Father of the Revolution," had refused to attend the Constitutional Convention as a delegate from Massachusetts. With the exception of Hamilton, New York's delegation was viciously anti-Union and left the Convention about half-way through its sitting, never to return. Two of Virginia's delegates, including her governor, refused to sign the constitution. Of the four, only Pennsylvania looked fairly safe, and it was by no means a foregone conclusion.

Three states ratified by unanimous votes before any one of the Big Four had acted favorably. Virginia and New York were the *last* two states to ratify before the nation was formed. They were numbers 10 and 11 in the order. The rest had had the faith and courage to start the union without them, if necessary. The new nation would have been handicapped to an almost unimaginable extent with any one of the four large states out of it, yet read again the wording of that final clause of the original constitution, and reflect upon the dumfounding amount of faith shown by it.

"The Big States Would Outvote Rest"

Many honest and well-meaning citizens in all the states apparently could not escape the dreadful assumption that all the other states would elect only "crafty knaves" to Congress—that con-

gressmen could never be found who would be able to lay aside sectional prejudices and selfishness. Still more unquestioned was the assumption that the representatives of the states in Congress would always vote as blocs—always as Virginians and Pennsylvanians and never as Americans in the interests of the whole, never as members of parties cutting across state lines. Similar assumptions are now made regarding the congress of a multinational federal union.

The United States, Canada, and other federal unions have had trouble to some extent with regionalism, but one will find exceedingly few instances in which all the representatives from a given state or province have ever voted together on one side of a controversial question. Legislative bodies always divide along party lines based upon differences of viewpoint as to policies. So it will be to a virtual certainty in any future world parliament in which deputies are elected representatives rather than diplomatic agents. It would be a stupendous change in human nature if they did not do so. Differences in opinion and judgment have always been the dominant factors which divide men in any democratically constituted legislative assembly.

Two Handicaps We Do Not Have Today

The American founding fathers had two great handicaps which we today do *not* have. First, transportation and communications were painfully slow, and information was very incomplete and inaccurate; the thirteen states were not nearly as inter-dependent economically as are nations today. Second, and above all, people then had to be persuaded to undertake a virtually untried and almost unheard-of political experiment—the federal system of joint or coordinate sovereignties, each government answerable directly to individual citizens.

This system has now demonstrated its practicality over long periods not only in the United States and in Canada but also on four other continents—under circumstances quite similar to those which will confront any future inter-national federal union—notably in Switzerland, Australia, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina and the Union of South Africa. We shall not be forced to any

hazardous experiment with a new *form* of government when we inaugurate a World Federal Union, designed to administer under law the common concerns of widely separated territories occupied by diverse populations speaking two or more languages. We have done just this, with astounding success on the whole, in eight great federal unions for periods ranging from the forty years among the Dutch and English of South Africa to our 150 years of experience in this melting pot of the races of earth.

Only World Federalism Can End Today's Anarchy

It is thus the proposal of World Federalists, stated most simply, that we shall find our way out of world chaos and international anarchy today by methods very like those followed by the American founders in 1787-9. ***In other words, by instituting world government under a constitution patterned broadly upon those of existing federal unions.***

As the American and Canadian pioneers did, we assume that it *may* be necessary and desirable to make the start with those nations *mutually* willing to join in forming the nucleus of a world federal union on an agreed basis.

We need only require that the number at first shall be sufficiently large and strong to provide an enduring and stable nucleus of an ultimately all-inclusive federal world government and that the conditions of admission be such as to assure a steady stream of additional members.

The history of fundamental reforms suggests that they have almost always been imminent when most persons could find nothing to say against them *except that they were unobtainable.* Institutionalized witchcraft and chattel slavery disappeared swiftly from the earth, once they were seen for what they were, despite the fact that they were as old as man himself and were deeply embedded in all the social, economic, religious and political institutions of mankind. We now are in the stage where vast numbers perceive clearly the suicidal and immoral folly of unqualified independence by national units—see absolute sovereignty as the primary cause of man's greatest scourge.

The supreme need now, therefore, is enough persons who (in

Garrison's words about slavery) will say concerning absolute nationalism: "I am in earnest. I will not equivocate; I will not excuse; and I will be heard." Those who want a federal world government need only take their thoughts off alleged impossibility or improbability and unite for the last great effort required for its achievement. The conditions which make its consummation seem so difficult are precisely those which make its need so urgent and so obvious to ever increasing numbers of men and women. It has never been easy, it never will be easy, to accomplish anything of large and fundamental significance.

We honor that minority in the history of each of our nations who "did the impossible" by bringing its hostile and conflicting elements into a more perfect union. Every time we acknowledge that "a world government must of course come sometime" we are saying in effect that we confidently expect our children or children's children to have the common sense, vision and courage our fathers had, but don't ask us to rise to the challenge of the supremely difficult!

If we in our time are content to be weaklings unworthy both of our ancestry and our posterity, we imperil the work of the past, the hope of the future. One bad link ruins the whole chain, and one weak generation can plunge mankind back into another age of unrestrained barbarism.

What our fathers did in their day, we can and must do in ours. Because they were able to substitute common government for interstate anarchy, it does not follow that we *will* do likewise. But since they were not daunted by seemingly insuperable odds and succeeded, we are justified in this similar situation in confident hope that we *can* do what they did. Faith is the unshakeable conviction that what should be done can be done.

It is our glorious task to insure that the 1940's shall bring the incalculable benefits of federalism to a war-torn and impoverished world as the 1780's brought the colossal advantages of federal union to the original American states. New political units by consent have always required a sublime leap of the human spirit.

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to call for a world constitutional convention, or

to use any fair and realistic method that gives promise of bringing all peoples together in one world, under the protection of a federal world government.

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31 E. 74th St., New York 21, N. Y.

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3. Such a world government must be federal in form, resting on limited powers delegated by the sovereign people. Such a system of allocated authority alone can combine necessary control of world affairs with self-government in national affairs.
4. World law must be applicable to and enforceable on individuals.
5. There can be no permanent peace without justice, no justice without law, no law without governmental institutions to make, administer, interpret and enforce it.
6. The only alternative to continued world anarchy is federal world government.

WORLD FEDERALISTS urge

. . . leadership by the government and people of the U.S.A. in the formation of a federal world government either

a. by proposing drastic amendments to the present United Nations Charter, or

b. by calling a new world constitutional convention, or

c. by any fair and realistic method that gives promise of bringing all people together in one world, under the protection of a federal world government.

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